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Abstract 
The defense industry has witnessed significant consolidation since the end of 
the Cold War. This paper explores the causes of the wave of defense mergers, as 
well as their impact. The analysis finds that the frequency of defense mergers is 
more strongly correlated with overall merger activity in the economy than with DoD 
outlays. In examining SAR cost data on weapons systems, only 54-64% of the 
weapons systems’ costs were affected following consolidation activity by the primary 
contractor that made them, of which 39-43% of the systems experienced a 
statistically significant decrease in their costs, and 14-21% experienced a statistically 
significant increase. Despite a 2/3 reduction in the number of prime contractors in 
the fixed wing aircraft sector between 1990 and 1998, about 43% of the systems 
experienced a statistically significantly lower cost estimate. For the tactical missile 
category, in which the number of prime contractors also fell by 2/3, 14.3% of the 
systems indicated statistically significantly higher post-merger estimates and 28.6% 
of them indicated statistically significantly lower post-merger estimates. Boeing, 
Lockheed, and Raytheon were among the few main primary contractors in several 
sectors following the consolidation wave. About 60% of the weapons systems 
examined in this analysis which were produced by them indicated a statistically 
significant change in their cost estimates. For Boeing and Lockheed, 50% of the 
systems exhibited a statistically significant reduction in cost estimates, while, for 
Raytheon, 40% of the systems experienced a significant cost increase. About 2/3 of 
the systems made by Lockheed and Martin Marietta manifested significant cost 
declines following the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger, and about ½ of the systems 
made by Boeing and McDonnell Douglas experienced a statistically significant 
decline in cost estimates following the merger. This suggests that, although market 
concentration levels may have increased in certain sectors, DoD’s costs often 
tended to be lower in the post-merger period for certain weapons systems. 
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Executive Summary 
The defense industry has witnessed significant consolidation since the end of 
the Cold War. This paper explores the causes of the wave of defense mergers, as 
well as their impact. The analysis finds that the frequency of defense mergers is 
more strongly correlated with overall merger activity in the economy than with DoD 
outlays. In examining SAR cost data on weapons systems, only 54-64% of the 
weapons systems’ costs were affected following consolidation activity by the primary 
contractor that made them, of which 39-43% of the systems experienced a 
statistically significant decrease in their costs, and 14-21% experienced a statistically 
significant increase. Despite a 2/3 reduction in the number of prime contractors in 
the fixed wing aircraft sector between 1990 and 1998, about 43% of the systems 
experienced a statistically significantly lower cost estimate. For the tactical missile 
category, in which the number of prime contractors also fell by 2/3, 14.3% of the 
systems indicated statistically significantly higher post-merger estimates and 28.6% 
of them indicated statistically significantly lower post-merger estimates. Boeing, 
Lockheed, and Raytheon were among the few main primary contractors in several 
sectors following the consolidation wave. About 60% of the weapons systems 
examined in this analysis which were produced by them indicated a statistically 
significant change in their cost estimates. For Boeing and Lockheed, 50% of the 
systems exhibited a statistically significant reduction in cost estimates, while, for 
Raytheon, 40% of the systems experienced a significant cost increase. About 2/3 of 
the systems made by Lockheed and Martin Marietta manifested significant cost 
declines following the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger, and about ½ of the systems 
made by Boeing and McDonnell Douglas experienced a statistically significant 
decline in cost estimates following the merger. This suggests that, although market 
concentration levels may have increased in certain sectors, DoD’s costs often 
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I. Introduction  
The defense industry has witnessed significant consolidation since the end of 
the Cold War. As the number of large defense contractors has declined, key public 
policy questions have arisen concerning whether the mergers have led to greater 
efficiencies, lower costs, and improvements in quality, or whether they have led to 
higher costs, fewer choices, and larger firms with unwieldy organizational structures. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine: (a) the roles of defense spending and 
broader merger activity in the economy on the frequency and size of defense 
mergers; (b) the patterns of defense consolidation and some of the related antitrust 
concerns; and (c) the impact of mergers of major defense contractors on the costs of 
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II.The Impact of Defense Spending and Broader 
Merger Activity on Defense Mergers 
The wave of defense mergers, particularly during the 1990’s, was partially 
driven by the need to eliminate excess capacity in the industry following the end of 
the Cold War. Overall defense spending, as well as defense procurement spending, 
grew rapidly during the 1980’s, declined following the end of the Cold War, 
increased towards the end of the 1990’s, and exhibited significant growth with the 
War on Terrorism. Indeed, overall defense spending grew 73.5%, and defense 
procurement spending grew 133.1% between 1981 and 1991, while between 1992 
and 1996, overall defense spending fell 10.9% and defense procurement spending 
fell 34.7%. Between 1997 and 2001, overall defense spending and defense 
procurement spending grew 12.7% and 15.3%, respectively, while between 2002 
and 2006, overall defense spending and defense procurement spending grew at 
49.7% and 43.6%, respectively.1 In constant FY 2001 dollars, overall defense 
spending declined 34.8% between FY 1985 and FY 1996 and declined 25.6% 
between FY 1990 and FY 1996. Defense procurement spending declined 67.2% 
between FY 1985 and FY 1996 and declined 53.77% between FY 1990 and FY 
1996.2    
The wave of mergers in the defense sector was also partially linked to overall 
merger patterns within the US economy. Table 1 shows the growth rate from year to 
year in terms of the number of defense mergers and the value of defense mergers, 
as compared to the comparable growth rates for merger activity in the US economy. 
                                            
1 These growth rates were calculated by the author from the raw data in the Historical Tables (Table 
3.2) for the United States Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, p. 56-60. The growth rates are not annualized 
nor adjusted for inflation. 
2 These growth rates were calculated by the author from the raw data in the Annual Report to the 
President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense in 2000, Appendix B-1. The growth rates are 
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Table 1: Annual Growth Rates in Merger Activity in the Defense Sector and in 
the Overall Economy 
Time Period Annual growth 
rates for merger 
activity (number of 
transactions) in the 
defense sector 
Annual growth 
rates for merger 
activity (number of 





($ value) in the 
defense sector 
Annual growth 
rates for merger 
activity ($ 
value) in the 
overall 
economy 
1992-1993 -44.83% 4.008% -82.37% 45.41% 
1993-1994 -6.25% 12.66% 268.1% 80.63% 
1994-1995 -33.00% 17.37% -94.13% 30.94% 
1995-1996 100.0% 66.51% 8571.4% 110.8% 
1996-1997 50.00% 33.32% -46.96% 35.68% 
1997-1998 70.00% 0.154% -59.25% 83.41% 
1998-1999 0.00% 18.94% 169.0% 19.16% 
1999-2000 -29.4% 3.28% 392.8% 832.9% 
2000-2001 -5.5% -13.37% -97.03% -94.72% 
2001-2002 26.47% -12.06% 164.7% -37.42% 
2002-2003 -34.88% 9.573% -55.97% 15.14% 
2003-2004 -10.7% 22.66% 50.50% 48.78% 
These annual growth rates were calculated by the author from raw data found in the Mergerstat 
Review for 2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and the 
Mergerstat Review for 1996. The defense sector, as defined by Factset Mergerstat, encompassed 
firms in Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 3761-3769, 3721-3728, and 3795.  
Growth in merger activity in the defense sector, whether measured by growth 
in value or growth in number of transactions, was generally lower than growth in 
merger activity in the overall economy. Growth in merger activity in the defense 
sector exceeded growth in merger activity in the industry overall (or exhibited less 
negative growth) in terms of the number of transactions and in terms of value in 5 
out of the 12 years (41.67%).  
Table 2 shows the number of defense mergers which were over $100 million 
in value as a percentage of total defense mergers, as well as the percentage of 
larger mergers which were over $100 million in size in the economy as a percentage 
of total mergers in the economy. The years in which large defense mergers were 
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overall economy, large mergers tended to be a smaller percentage of the total 
number of mergers due to the total volume of mergers during the mid- to late 1990’s.  
Table 2: Percentage of Defense Mergers and Mergers in the Overall Economy 
Exceeding $100 Million in Value 
Time Period Number of $100m plus 
transactions as a percentage 
of total transactions in the 
defense industry 
Number of $100m 
plus transactions as a 
percentage of total 
transactions in the 
overall economy 
1991 0.00% 8.01% 
1992 27.59% 7.54% 
1993 18.75% 9.03% 
1994 40.0% 12.64% 
1995 0.00% 13.2% 
1996 40.0% 10.84% 
1997 20.0% 11.16% 
1998 19.6% 11.55% 
1999 13.73% 11.81% 
2000 16.67% 12.00% 
2001 17.64% 8.44% 
2002 6.977% 8.33% 
2003 10.71% 8.19% 
2004 24.00% 8.60% 
These percentages were calculated by the author from raw data found in the Mergerstat Review for 
2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and the Mergerstat Review 
for 1996. The defense sector, as defined by Factset Mergerstat, encompassed firms in Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) codes 3761-3769, 3721-3728, and 3795.  
Industry observers often cite defense spending and overall merger activity as 
the two forces behind defense sector mergers (Korb, 1996). But, is defense merger 
activity more linked to the level of DoD spending or to the overall level of merger 
activity in the economy?  Which one of these is a more significant force? Table 3, 
which shows correlations between various measures of defense merger activity and 
merger activity in the overall economy, as well as between defense merger activity 
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linked to overall activity in the economy. This supports the hypothesis that merger 
activity was not necessarily entirely driven by the need to downsize and reduce 
excess capacity in the wake of the Cold War.  
The correlations use data covering the period between 1992 and 2004. The 
second column of Table 3 shows the correlations between the number of defense 
mergers in a given year and: (a) the overall level of DoD outlays in that year; (b) the 
level of DoD procurement outlays in that year; (c) the overall level of DoD outlays in 
the previous year; (d) the level of DoD procurement outlays in the previous year; and 
(e) the level of overall merger activity in the economy. The third column of Table 3 
shows the comparable correlations for defense merger activity as measured by 
dollar value, rather than by number of transactions.  
Table 3: Correlations between DoD Outlays, Merger Activity in the Economy, 
and Merger Activity in the Defense Sector 
Correlation between: Number of defense merger 
transactions in a given year 
Dollar value of defense merger 
transactions in a given year 
Level of overall DoD outlays in 
a given year 
-0.0269 -0.2058 
 
Level of DoD procurement 
outlays in a given year 
-0.3591 -0.3783 
Level of overall DoD outlays in 
the previous year 
-0.1929 -0.2947 
Level of DoD procurement 
outlays in the previous year 
-0.6097 -0.3916 
Number of mergers in the 
overall economy in a given 
year 
0.6498  
Dollar value of mergers in the 
overall economy in a given 
year 
 0.9399 
The statistical correlations were calculated by the author from raw data found in the Historical Tables 
(Table 3.2) for the Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, p. 56-50, and from the raw data found in the 
Mergerstat Review for 2005, the Mergerstat Review for 2002, the Mergerstat Review for 1997, and 
the Mergerstat Review for 1996. 
The correlations between defense merger activity (regardless of how it is 
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procurement levels, and whether it occurred in the current year or in the previous 
year) are negative, as would be expected—as defense spending goes down, 
defense merger activity goes up. Nevertheless, the correlations tend to be weak. 
Procurement outlays move much more strongly in the opposite direction from 
defense transactions than overall DoD outlays do. Correlating previous year DoD 
overall outlays and procurement outlays with current-year merger activity (in terms of 
either transactions or value) yields a stronger relationship than correlating current-
year outlays with current-year merger activity. This suggests that, since the merger 
process requires time, mergers are a delayed response to spending levels in 
previous years. The tightest negative relationship is between merger activity (as 
measured by the number of transactions) and DoD procurement outlays in the 
previous year.  
The correlations are strongly positive between merger activity in the defense 
sector and merger activity in the overall economy in a given year (excluding defense 
mergers)—as one increases, the other also increases. The correlation is strongly 
positive between the number of defense mergers and the number of mergers in the 
economy overall (excluding defense mergers) at 0.6498, while the correlation is very 
strongly positive between the dollar value of mergers in the overall economy 
(excluding defense mergers) and the dollar value of defense mergers at 0.9399.  
In summary, Table 3 suggests that although the wave of defense mergers 
was driven by both DoD spending and by overall economic merger activity, overall 
economic merger activity was much more strongly correlated. Consequently, the 
decline in Cold War spending and its impact on excess capacity was less important 
than overall economic growth, stock market conditions, and the need for defense 
firms to defensively merge as their rivals merged so that they would not be left out in 
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III.Patterns of Defense Consolidation and Antitrust 
Concerns 
In July, 1993, Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry, at a summit known as 
the “Last Supper,” met with representatives of the major defense contractors and 
encouraged significant defense sector consolidation (Ricks & Cole, 1998; Cole, 
1996).  Between 1990 and 1998, the number of prime contractors decreased 
significantly due to consolidation in 10 of the 12 key defense sectors identified by 
DoD. These 10 sectors included: tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable 
launch vehicles, satellites, surface ships, tactical wheeled vehicles, tracked combat 
vehicles, strategic missiles, torpedoes, and rotary-wing aircraft. Table 4 shows, for 
each of the 10 sectors, the number of prime contractors in 1990, the number of 
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Table 4:  Reduction in Prime Contractors in Various Weapons Systems 
Sectors between 1990 and 1998 
Sector Number of prime 
contractors in 1990 
Number of prime 
contractors in 1998 
Percentage reduction 
Tactical Missiles 13 4 -69.2% 
Fixed-wing Aircraft 8 3 -62.5% 
Expendable Launch 
Vehicles 
6 2 -66.7% 
Satellites 8 5 -37.5% 
Surface Ships 8 5 -37.5% 
Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles 
6 4 -33.3% 
Tracked Combat 
Vehicles 
3 2 -33.0% 
Strategic Missiles 3 2 -33.0% 
Torpedoes 3 2 -33.0% 
Rotary-wing Aircraft 4 3 -25.0% 
Data on the sectors and the number of contractors in 1990 and 1998 are derived from the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees on the  Defense Industry: 
Consolidation and Options for Preserving Competition from April, 1998. 
The percentage reduction in contractors exceeded 60% in 3 of the 10 sectors, 
and varied between 25% and 37.5% in the remaining 7 of the 10 sectors. The major 
giants which emerged out of this consolidation across these sectors were Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman, and, to a lesser degree, Raytheon and 
General Dynamics. Between 1990 and 1998, the three sectors which experienced 
the most consolidation, and which were dominated by contractors which only 
included Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, were: tactical 
missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and expendable launch vehicles.  
By 1998, Boeing was one of the prime contractors in 6 of the 10 markets: 
tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable launch vehicles, satellites, strategic 
missiles, and rotary-wing aircraft. Lockheed Martin was one of the prime contractors 
in 5 of the 10 sectors: tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, expendable launch 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 11 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
contractors in 3 of the 10 sectors: tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and 
torpedoes. General Dynamics was one of the prime contractors in 2 of the 10 
markets: tracked combat vehicles and surface ships. Finally, Raytheon was one of 
the prime contractors in 2 of the 10 markets: tactical missiles and torpedoes.  
With the increasing numbers of defense mergers in the mid- to late 1990’s, 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) became more concerned that consolidation was leading to a 
reduction in competition and an increase in anticompetitive activity. As Joel Klein, 
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ noted in his address 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in June, 1998, “A number of defense 
mergers proceeded unchallenged over the last 5 years, which rationalized capacity, 
but if that rationalization goes too far, it can harm competition” (Klein, 1998, p.7). 
Indeed, the DOJ had challenged two mergers in 1997— Raytheon’s acquisition of 
Hughes Aircraft (the aircraft subsidiary of General Motors) and Raytheon’s 
acquisition of the defense electronics division of Texas Instruments—but then 
allowed both of them to go through provided that divestitures of certain key divisions 
occurred prior to the merger in order to protect competition. In 1998, however, the 
DOJ blocked the merger between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, since 
the DOJ believed that the merger would lead to a reduction in competition and 
innovation in submarine sonar systems, military aircraft radar, and various electronic 
warfare systems. This proposed $11.6 billion acquisition was the largest acquisition 
that the DOJ had challenged in its history up to that point (Klein, 1998), and the 
challenge was supported by the Pentagon since Defense Secretary Cohen also 
thought that the merger would be anticompetitive (Ricks & Cole, 1998). Lockheed 
and Northrop called off the merger in July, 1998, prior to their September trial date 
(Fidler & Lewis, 1998).  
Analyzing the anticompetitive impact of consolidation in the defense sector 
involves different considerations from analyzing consolidation in other industries for 
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competitors, the analysis can’t always include foreign weapons manufacturers for 
security reasons, although, in other industries, foreign manufacturers can be 
included in defining the boundaries of the market that would be affected by the 
merger. Second, traditional industries have a broader spectrum of consumers for the 
product, whereas DoD is the main buyer for weapons systems. Consequently, it 
plays a highly significant role in the DOJ and FTC deliberations. Third, lower barriers 
to entry would allow new entrants to enter the market and reduce the possible 
anticompetitive effects of increased consolidation, such as higher pricing. 
Nevertheless, the government contracting process makes it harder for new entrants 
to gain a foothold and tends to give an advantage to incumbent firms, which know 
the government contracting system better.  
Either vertical or horizontal consolidations could contribute to a negative 
outcome. Vertical mergers might lead to foreclosure to competitors of key input 
suppliers or distributors along the vertical supply chain. For example, one of the 
concerns about the proposed Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman merger had been 
that Lockheed Martin would have control of a key supplier of electronics which 
supplied Boeing’s planes, as well as its own planes. This could enable it to limit 
Boeing’s access to the supplier. On the other hand, Lockheed argued that the 
Pentagon could monitor the selections of equipment from outside suppliers and that 
the process was sufficiently transparent that this would not be an issue. Indeed, 
Lockheed argued that the mission computers in its F-16 planes came from Raytheon 
(Ricks & Cole,1998). A second example of concerns over vertical integration was 
when the CEO of McDonnell Douglas, in April, 1996, announced that McDonnell 
Douglas would stop buying parts from Loral for its jet fighters once Lockheed Martin 
acquired Loral. Paul Kaminski, the chief of procurement at the Pentagon, wrote to 
McDonnell Douglas, stating that this could ‘“increase the cost or lower the quality of 
the products you supply”’ and that if the best product is offered by a given supplier, 
which ‘“happens to be Loral, then McDonnell Douglas should continue to buy from 
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Horizontal mergers, in the absence of viable international competition or entry 
by new companies, could lead to increased market power and higher prices in 
certain sectors. For example, one of the concerns with Raytheon’s acquisition of 
Hughes Aircraft and the defense divisions of Texas Instruments in 1997 was that 
these acquisitions would provide Raytheon with a near monopoly position in spy 
satellite sensors, night vision equipment, and air-to-air missiles. Hughes and 
Raytheon had previously been strong competitors for missile contracts, and, 
according to the chief of acquisitions at the Pentagon, Paul Kaminiski, “their 
competition saved taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, shaving 70 percent from 
Hughes’ original price.” Raytheon, on the other hand, had argued that other 
companies had competed in missile competitions and had won, citing McDonnell 
Douglas’ and Lockheed Martin’s success in bidding for the JASSM missile contract 
(Mintz,1997). 
On the other hand, consolidation might also lead to more innovative or less 
costly weapons systems due to greater pooling of knowledge between consolidating 
contractors. For example, Boeing, which had acquired Rockwell and McDonnell 
Douglas, succeeded over Lockheed in winning a $5 billion contract for a National 
Reconnaissance Satellite in 1999. At the time, some argued that the combination of 
knowledge and talent between McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, and Boeing enabled 
the unified entity to win the contract and that this would not have been possible 
without consolidation (Flanigan, 1999). A second example is when the Navy in early 
September, 1997 thought that the proposed merger between Lockheed Martin and 
Northrop Grumman would have actually enabled Lockheed, which had a weaker 
background in building naval aircraft, to compete more effectively against Boeing in 
the competition for the new Joint Strike Fighter (Ricks & Cole, 1998). The merger, as 
discussed earlier, did not take place. 
Consolidation activity also could lead to improved cost efficiencies from 
reduced overhead costs—combining duplicative facilities and corporate 
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more effectively using pre-existing capacity. Indeed, when the Lockheed-Martin 
Marietta merger took place in 1995, it was estimated that merging 
telecommunications operations, research divisions, and headquarters, would save 
$3 billion over the following five years (Mintz, 1994). Some of the mergers clearly 
failed to yield their projected saving, however. For example, Martin Marietta’s 1993 
acquisition of General Electric Aerospace had only yielded half of the expected cost 
savings three years later, according to the GAO (Foote, 1996). Two years after the 
union of Hughes Aircraft and General Dynamics’ missile division in 1992, the 
Inspector General could not verify that the consolidation had saved the projected 
$600 million for the Pentagon (Korb, 1996). 
Has the wave of defense mergers led to cost savings for DoD? According to 
the Los Angeles Times in October, 1999, “Almost a decade of consolidation in the 
defense industry has failed to deliver the benefits of lower costs for the Pentagon. 
And the mergers of the ‘90’s that were supposed to produce stronger and more 
innovative defense contractors have more often caused corporate indigestion” 
(Flanigan, 1999). Industry observers argued that innovation had suffered from the 
mergers, and that the companies had become too big and were expending 
significant effort in managing themselves (Flanigan, 1999).  
The issue of whether DoD recognized cost savings from the wave of 
consolidation was further complicated by its decision to pay the restructuring costs of 
consolidation beginning in July, 1993 provided that certain conditions from the 
consolidation were met, such as that the projected savings from the restructuring 
would exceed the costs. Under the 1997 DoD Appropriations Act, projected savings 
needed to exceed costs by a ratio of two to one for business combinations occurring 
after September 30, 1996, in order for restructuring costs to be reimbursed (Cooper, 
1997). In 1997, DoD calculated that, through September 30, 1996, for every $1.00 
that it paid in restructuring costs, it estimated $1.93 in savings because it had paid 
$179.2 million in restructuring costs and realized savings of $346.7 million. 
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much less than the contractors had actually estimated. For Lockheed Martin, the 
estimated savings used to certify the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger as eligible for 
restructuring, as of September 30, 1996, was less than half of the savings estimate 
which had originally been projected (Cooper, 1997). 
IV.Analysis of Cost Data on Weapons Systems by 
Type and by Defense Contractor 
This analysis examines whether cost estimates for weapons systems made 
by leading defense contractors increased or decreased following a merger with 
another major defense contractor. The analysis used cost data from the summary 
tables in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARS) which are submitted to Congress 
by DoD and which report the acquisition costs of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPS).3 Each SAR contains a variety of various items on the mission of 
the weapons system and the contractors involved, as well as data on the costs of 
the weapons system, including baseline cost estimates and quantity estimates, 
current cost estimates and quantity estimates, and a decomposition of cost changes 
into quantity cost changes, schedule cost changes, engineering cost changes, 
support cost changes, estimating cost changes, and other cost changes. The period 
covered in the SAR data used in this analysis encompassed March, 1981 until June, 
2006.  
The analysis examined 28 weapons systems/programs; this is only a subset 
of the weapons programs available in the SARS. These systems were selected 
because: (a) the primary contractor was involved in a merger with a major defense 
                                            
3 MDAP (Major Defense Acquisition Program)—“Defined in 10 USC § 2430 as a Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified program (as determined by 
the Secretary of Defense) and that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as a major defense 
acquisition program, or that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total 
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $365,000,000 (updated to 
FY 2000 constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than 
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contractor during the period covered; (b) there was enough time-series data to 
examine the pre-merger and the post-merger period; (c) the weapons system was 
only made for one of the services; and (d) the contract for the weapons system, 
during the period covered, did not have a defense contractor that was not involved in 
the merger as its primary contractor. The research is still ongoing, and it is expected 
that more weapons systems/programs will be included in an expanded version of 
this preliminary study.  
This analysis examines the current-year cost estimates in base-year dollars of 
each weapons system/program over time. This is because current-year cost 
estimates in base-year dollars capture overall pre- and post-merger effects better 
than other variables in the SARS, which decompose the cost change into quantity 
changes, schedule changes, engineering changes, etc. A merger could impact cost 
estimates through any of these avenues, so year-to-year changes in overall current-
year cost estimates in base-year dollars provided the best measure. An expanded 
version of this preliminary study intends to examine the other components of the 
cost change decomposition in greater detail. Current-year cost estimates in base-
year dollars were also used to minimize the impact of inflation. 
The regression model used for each of the 28 weapons systems/programs 
regressed current-year cost estimates in base-year dollars for a given weapons 
system on a time-trend variable and on an indicator variable that took on the value of 
“1” after the merger of its primary contractor and “0” before the merger. The time 
trend controlled for the increases in cost estimates over time. The regression model 
appears below: 
(Current-year cost estimates in base-year dollars)i = α + β1 (time trend)i + β2 
(post-merger indicator variable)i 
The regression was run over the time-series data for each weapons system. 
In one set of regressions, the post-merger effect was assumed to take place 
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date of the merger. In the second set of regressions, the post-merger effect was 
assumed to take place beginning with the report date of the SAR which was the 
second nearest chronologically to the effective date of the merger. Although the 
timing of the impact of a merger on SAR cost estimates can vary between 
contractors and weapons systems, the analyses focused on the nearest SAR or the 
second-nearest SAR to the merger date for consistency.  
Tables 5 and 6 show that the empirical results are largely robust, regardless 
of whether the post-merger effect is assumed to occur beginning with the SAR 
nearest chronologically to the effective merger date or beginning with the second-
nearest SAR to the effective merger date. The first column includes the name of the 
weapons system; the second column gives the coefficient (and its sign) for the post-
merger indicator variable; the third column provides the p-value for the statistical 
significance of the post-merger effect on cost estimates; the fourth column gives the 
coefficient (and sign) on the time trend, and the fifth column provides the p-value for 
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Table 5: Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect Beginning at the SAR 

















AH-64 36.9611 0.763 47.257 0.000 
AIM-9X 1554.8 0.000 4.8778 0.568 
ASAS -1419.66 0.000 16.395 0.046 
AMRAAM -2826.00 0.000 183.26 0.000 
ATACMS 134.47 0.366 29.903 0.000 
AV-8B -113.64 0.001 6.5453 0.005 
ATCCS 179.68 0.046 -12.833 0.003 
ATICRM -49.355 0.899 64.324 0.007 
C-17 17687.66 0.000 319.77 0.000 
DDG-51 -6357.78 0.001 740.82 0.000 
FA-18 -21133.99 0.002 635.6 0.014 
F-22 -8867.30 0.151 1074.1 0.000 
Javelin -78.669 0.840 14.043 0.291 
JDAM -669.47 0.032 147.651 0.000 
JSOW 542.25 0.609 -9.9954 0.827 
JSTARS -1396.20 0.003 168.99 0.000 
LHD-1 251.02 0.210 53.764 0.000 
Longbow Apache -381.75 0.612 149.51 0.000 
Longbow Hellfire -759.73 0.033 36.382 0.008 
NAVSTAR User 
Equipment 
-212.399 0.013 29.502 0.000 
Titan IV -9604.985 0.000 504.366 0.000 
DMSP 15.714 0.322 6.557 0.000 
FBCB2 -422.658 0.180 4.646 0.876 
MLRS -28.854 0.744 28.307 0.000 
Strategic Sealift 
Program 
58.530 0.685 20.624 0.029 
T45TS 143.59 0.401 47.809 0.000 
Trident -2111.671 0.056 10.3506 0.679 
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Table 6: Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect Beginning at the 
Second Nearest SAR to the Effective Date of the Merger 













AH-64 87.88 0.48 45.65 0.000 
AIM-9X 1279.3 0.000 9.408 0.422 
ASAS -1004.9 0.002 -8.205 0.733 
AMRAAM -2953.6 0.000 184.6 0.000 
ATACMS 234.6 0.108 27.20 0.000 
AV-8B -116.95 0.001 7.088 0.004 
ATCCS 194.91 0.033 -13.60 0.002 
ATICRM 255.64 0.504 49.295 0.031 
C-17 17138.7 0.000 336.68 0.000 
DDG-51 -7478.1 0.000 761.47 0.000 
FA-18 -24329.8 0.000 751.15 0.003 
F-22 -11220 0.067 1127.4 0.000 
Javelin 1156.99 0.002 -22.196 0.067 
JDAM -698.65 0.028 149.39 0.000 
JSOW 1631.28 0.126 -50.687 0.276 
JSTARS -1300.27 0.005 166.48 0.000 
LHD-1 144.32 0.476 55.225 0.000 
Longbow Apache -669.24 0.372 158.10 0.000 
Longbow Hellfire -789.56 0.030 38.132 0.007 
NAVSTAR User 
Equipment 
-191.89 0.024 28.756 0.000 
Titan IV -10094.5 0.000 513.14 0.000 
DMSP 30.865 0.041 5.910 0.000 
FBCB2 -606.34 0.056 22.475 0.456 
MLRS -34.901 0.693 28.377 0.000 
Strategic Sealift 
Program 
93.856 0.506 19.345 0.028 
T45TS 63.6989 0.707 49.373 0.000 
Trident -1489.63 0.178 -2.125 0.933 
JPATS 947.42 0.006 118.27 0.000 
 
Table 7 summarizes the findings of Tables 5 and 6. Again, there is little 
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closest to the merger effective date and the findings if the merger effect is assumed 
to begin at the second nearest SAR to the merger effective date. Between 54% and 
64% of the systems examined in the analysis experienced a statistically significant 
change in their cost estimates following a merger, controlling for the time trend. 
Between 39% and 43% of the systems experienced a statistically significant 
negative reduction in cost estimates in the post-merger period, controlling for the 
time trend, while between 14% and 21% of the systems experienced a positive, 
statistically significant cost increase. This suggests that defense mergers did not 
always experience a statistically significant change in their cost estimates post-
merger, but that, for those systems that did, the cost estimates were more likely to 
decrease than to increase, even controlling for the time trend.     
Table 7: Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-merger Change 
in Cost Estimates 
 Percentage of 
systems 
experiencing 




















at the SAR 
closest to the 
merger 
effective date 
14.3% 39.3% 53.6% 
Post-merger 
effect begins 
at the second 
nearest SAR 
to the merger 
effective date 
21.4% 42.9% 64.3% 
 
Table 8 summarizes the weapons systems findings from Table 5 and 
categorizes those results based on the type of weapons system classification found 
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and the munitions sector. The classification of the weapons systems into these 
broader categories was done by examining the description of the weapons systems 
in the SARS, consulting Jane’s, reading materials written by the defense contractors, 
examining The 2007-2008 Weapons Systems from the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, and reading detail 
on each system written by the Federation of American Scientists. 
The categories which were most affected by the mergers (in the sense that 
40-70% of the weapons systems in those categories exhibited a statistically 
significant post-merger change in cost estimates) were the strategic electronics 
category, the tactical missile category, and the fixed-wing aircraft category. About 
29-43% of those systems exhibited a statistically significant reduction in cost 
estimates, controlling for the time trend. Based on the data in Table 4, the number of 
prime contractors in the fixed-wing aircraft sector experienced a 62.5% decline 
between 1990 and 1998. Consequently, this analysis suggests that although market 
concentration in the fixed-wing aircraft sector increased, this led to more significant 
cost decreases than cost increases in weapons systems. The evidence is similar for 
the tactical missile category, in which, based on the data in Table 4, the number of 
contractors declined 69.2% between 1990 and 1998. About 43% of the weapons in 
the tactical missile category exhibited statistically significant changes in their cost 
estimates, of which 14.3% of them exhibited significant increases, and 28.6% of 
them exhibited significant decreases. The number of prime contractors in the surface 
ships category declined 37.5%, but the only system in that category that manifested 
a significant change exhibited a cost decline. The analysis had fewer systems in the 
rotary aircraft, strategic missile, munitions, and satellite categories, but a subsequent 
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Table 8: Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-Merger Change 
in Cost Estimates by Equipment Type 
 Percentage of 












significantly lower cost 
estimate post-merger 
Percentage of 



























20% 40% 60% 














0% 33% 33% 
Satellite 
DMSP 
0% 0%  0% 
Munition 
JDAM 
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Table 9 summarizes the results in Table 5 by defense contractor. About 60% 
of the weapons systems made by Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed experienced 
statistically significant changes in their cost estimates following their mergers. 
Raytheon is the only one of the major contractors which had a higher percentage of 
weapons systems (40%) that experienced a statistically significant cost increase 
than the percentage of weapons systems (20%) that experienced a statistically 
significant cost decrease. About half of the weapons systems made by Lockheed, 
General Dynamics, and Boeing experienced a statistically significantly lower post-
merger cost estimate. As discussed earlier, by 1998, Boeing was one of the prime 
contractors in 6 of the 10 markets, and Lockheed Martin was one of the prime 
contractors in 5 of the 10 markets. Again, this evidence suggests that although these 
contractors were obtaining greater market share through their consolidation, the 
mergers were more likely to reduce cost estimates for the weapons systems than to 
increase them. Raytheon is the exception, but it was one of the prime contractors in 
only 2 of the 10 markets (as delineated by the 1998 GAO report) and so had less 
opportunity for market power than Lockheed Martin and Boeing.  
Table 9: Summary of Statistically Significant Cost Changes by Defense 
Contractor 
 Percentage of 














significantly lower cost 
estimate post-merger 
Percentage of 







(higher or lower) 
Northrop 0% 20% 20% 
Boeing 12.5% 50% 62.5% 
General Dynamics 0% 50% 50% 
Raytheon 40% 20% 60% 
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Table 10 explores the impact of the merger between Lockheed and Martin 
Marietta (effective on March 16, 1995) and the merger between Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas (effective on August 1, 1997) on the weapons systems produced 
by these prime contractors for which sufficient data was available. The Lockheed-
Martin Marietta merger impacted over 2/3 of the weapons systems examined, all of 
which experienced a statistically significant decline in cost estimates, controlling for 
the time trend. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger impacted 50% of the 
weapons systems examined, of which all of them experienced a statistically 
significant decline in cost estimates, controlling for the time trend.   
Table 10: Impact of Selected Defense Mergers on Weapons Systems Cost 
Estimates 
 Percentage of 
systems made by 
the defense 
contractors involved 
in a specific merger 






systems made by 
defense contractors 
involved in a 
specific merger 






systems made by 
the defense 
contractors involved 
in a specific merger 















0% 66.7% 66.7% 
Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas  
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V. Conclusions 
This study examines evidence on the causes and the results of the defense 
merger wave of the late 1990s. Although the analysis is by no means exhaustive, it 
does suggest several key findings. 
First, defense mergers are negatively correlated with DoD procurement 
outlays. The correlation between defense mergers in a given year and DoD 
procurement outlays in the previous year are stronger than correlations of measures 
in the current year. This suggests that merger activity is more likely to be a delayed 
response to previous spending levels than to current spending levels.   
Second, the correlations between defense merger activity and overall merger 
activity in the economy are strongly positive. On balance, the correlations between 
defense merger activity and overall merger activity are much stronger than the 
correlations between defense merger activity and DoD outlays. This suggests that 
merger activity was driven less by declines in spending following the Cold War, and 
more by a stronger economy and a vibrant financial market.  
Third, the reduction in the number of prime contractors between 1990 and 
1998 was more substantial in certain sectors than in others and resulted in some of 
the defense contractors becoming dominant across sectors. The tactical missiles, 
fixed-wing aircraft, and expendable launch vehicle sectors experienced a 2/3 
reduction in the number of prime contractors during the period. The major giants 
which emerged from the consolidation were Boeing (one of the prime contractors in 
6 of the 10 sectors), Lockheed Martin (one of the prime contractors in 5 of the 10 
sectors), and Northrop Grumman (one of the prime contractors in 3 of the 10 
markets).  
Fourth, in examining the SAR cost data on 28 weapons systems, only 54-
64% of them exhibited a statistically significant post-merger cost change, which 
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About 39-43% of the weapons systems examined in this analysis experienced a 
statistically significant decrease in cost estimates, controlling for the time trend, and 
about 14-21% of the systems experienced a statistically significant increase in cost 
estimates. This suggests that, to the extent that the weapons systems were 
impacted by mergers, a greater proportion of them experienced a reduction in costs 
rather than an increase in costs.  
Fifth, when the weapons systems are classified into the 10 categories 
discussed in the 1998 GAO Report (with two additional categories), the fixed-wing 
aircraft, strategic electronics, and tactical missile categories had the highest 
percentage of systems which experienced a statistically significant post-merger 
change. Within the fixed-wing aircraft sector, about 40% of the systems experienced 
a statistically significantly lower cost estimate during the post-merger period. In the 
tactical missile category, 28.6% of the systems surveyed experienced a statistically 
significantly lower post-merger cost estimate, and 14.3% of the systems experienced 
a statistically significantly higher post-merger cost estimate. This suggests that in the 
fixed-wing aircraft sector and in the tactical missile sector, the increase in market 
concentration did not result in higher costs for DoD.  
Sixth, when the weapons systems were identified with their primary 
contractor, around 60% of the weapons systems examined in this analysis which 
were produced by Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed experienced a statistically 
significant change in their cost estimates. For Boeing and Lockheed, 50% of the 
systems experienced a statistically significant reduction in cost estimates. Raytheon 
was the only contractor for whom 40% of the systems experienced a statistically 
significant increase in their cost estimates. This suggests that the increases in 
market power may not have translated into higher costs for DoD, especially for 
systems made by Lockheed and Boeing. Indeed, 2/3 of the systems made by 
Lockheed and Martin Marietta experienced a statistically significant decline in cost 
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McDonnell Douglas experienced a statistically significant decline in cost estimates 
following their merger.    
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that, although market concentration 
levels in certain sectors increased due to the wave of defense mergers,  DoD’s costs 
across weapons systems tended to be lower in the post-merger period. Although 
further research on a larger sample of weapons systems distributed across various 
sectors is necessary to more fully inform the public policy discourse, this study 
indicates that increases in market power do not necessarily lead to an 
anticompetitive outcome in pricing. Additional research on innovation cycles within 
the weapons systems is necessary, as well as a greater assessment of the degree 
to which international competition or the possibility of entry of smaller competitors in 
some of these sub-sectors constrained cost increases. Many of the questions and 
concerns in the earlier rounds of consolidation may emerge if a second round 
begins, possibly at a more global level; therefore, an assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the most recent round of mergers during the late 1990’s is 
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